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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
CHARLES MURRAY, ADMNSTR, 
Plaintiff 
v 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Defendant 
CASE NO. 312322 
JUDGE SUSTER 
STATE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD'S 
\>VRITINGS IN MORETTI BOOK 
The State of Ohio, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Cuyahoga County, and A. Steven Dever, Assistant Prosecutor, submits herewith its 
Memorandum in Support of admission into evidence of the written statement of Samuel H. 
Sheppard , inscribed in Phyllis Moretti 's copy of the book authored by Sheppard, Endure and 
Conquer. The state submits that the statement is an admission against interest and admissible 
pursuant to Evid. R. 804 (B)(3), and as evidence attacking the credibility of a hearsay declarant 
pursuant to Evid. R. 806, all as set forth in the memorandum attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
.Ste en Dever 
Marilyn Cassidy (00146 7) 
Assistant Prosecutors 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SHEPPARD'S WRITTEN ADMISSION 
AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
STATEMENT AGAINST PECUNIARY/ PENAL INTEREST 
Pecuniary Interest 
In creating the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule, Evid.R. 804(B)(3) 
provides: 
Statement against interest. A statement that was at the time of its making 
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to 
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability, whether offered to 
exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
In Trimble v. Stewart (1988), WL 14074 (11th Dist), unreported, 
(attached) the reviewing court upheld the admission into evidence, pursuant to 
Evid. R. 804(B)( 3), of two letters from the deceased to her father. Father had 
forwarded twenty three thousand dollars for the decedent to deposit in her account 
and to make certain investments on his behalf. Two letters from the decedent 
acknowledged his ownership of the funds and her intention to do with them as he 
wished. In affirming the letters' admissibility, the court found the letters to be, at 
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the time of their making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or 
proprietary interest * * * that a reasonable man in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true. 
The statement at issue satisfies criteria set forth by Ohio courts for admission 
into evidence as an 804 (B)(3) statement against interest. First, Sheppard's statement is 
' clearly against his pecuniary interest. Phyllis Moretti will testify that Sheppard signed 
the book in April of 1969. At that time, Sheppard had a lawsuit pending against Louis 
Seltzer, the Cleveland Press and Dr. Samuel Gerber. The complaint, filed in November of 
1967, sought damages for alleged injury to his character and for alleged wrongful 
conviction and ten year imprisonment. The complaint was dismissed from the district 
court and Sheppard took an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. That 
court did not render its opinion until January 21, 1970. (See Exhibits A & B, attached). 
His written admission that he perpetrated the homicide of Mrs. Sheppard would without 
question invalidate any claim of wrongful conviction or defamation. 
Penal Interest 
Evid. R. 804 (B) (3) also provides that statements against one's own penal interest 
may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rnle . It is significant that despite his 
ultimate acquittal on the murder charge, and his insulation from further jeopardy 
resulting from her death, Samuel H. Sheppard's admission to the murder of his wife 
could subject him to a charge of perjury. Dr. Sheppard testified under oath in his first 
trial that he did not commit the homicide. Perjury is a felony of the third degree and 
carries with it the possibility of incarceration and fines. 
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Dr. Sheppard is indisputably unavailable. Finally, as for indicia ofreliability, the State of 
Ohio will present expert testimony identifying the handwriting as that of Samuel 
Sheppard. In addition the State will present Susan Fortunato, a forensic chemist for the 
Secret Service who will identify the ink as ink that was commercially available as of 
May of 1961. 
THE STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO EVID. R. 806, 
IMPEACHMENT OF A HEARSAY DECLARANT 
Through various witnesses, including the former testimony of Sam Sheppard, and the 
examination of Fred Drenkhan, F. Lee Bailey, Sam Reese Sheppard, and others, the 
hearsay testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard has already been admitted into evidence. As 
such, the State of Ohio is now permitted to attack the credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard 
the same as if he had been a testifying witness. Evid R. 806 provides in pertinent part: 
(A) When a hearsay statement ... has been admitted in evidence, the 
creditability of the declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence that would 
be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. 
The credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard is now subject to attack by the State of Ohio by all 
permissible means, including the presentation of inconsistent statements, bias interest, 
etc .. 
When hearsay testimony is admitted in a trial, particularly, when the declarant of 
hearsay is not presented at trial, Evid. R. 806 operates to alleviate in some degree the 
disadvantage which arises when the jury is not given an opportunity to view the 
declarant's demanor or "to see his credibility and veracity tested under cross 
examination." State v. Klein (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 208, 212. Indeed, the refusal to 
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permit an attack on the credibility of a hearsay declarant is highly prejudicial and has 
resulted in the reversal of criminal convictions. State v. Klein, supra at 212. (Inasmuch 
as the trial court received in evidence [declarant] Emmons' hearsay statement through 
[witness] Taylor's testimony, it committed error prejudicial to [criminal defendant] 
appellant by excluding Emmons' inconsistent written statements offered to impeach him. 
, 
Reversal [of the conviction] is therefore required.") (State v. Crossen October 18 1988), 
4th Dist. Case No. 902 unreported, (attached) (reversing a conviction and holding that 
non-testifying "declarant's inconsistent prior or subsequent statements, whether oral or 
written, may be admitted for purposes of impeaching him.") 
The right to impeach a non-testifying declarant pursuant to Evid. R. 806 exists 
irrespective of whether the party against whom the hearsay was admitted objected and 
even if the proponent of the hearsay later argues that the statements were not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6-7. 
In the instant case, numerous statements of Samuel H. Sheppard have 
already been admitted into evidence. Accordingly, the State of Ohio is entitled to 
impeach the credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard as a declarant by use of his writings in the 
Moreti book. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, defendant respectfully submits that the testimony of Phyllis Moretti, 
and the written statement of Samuel H. Sheppard are properly admissible evidence. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
even Dever 
Marilyn Cassidy (001 64 7) 
Assistant Prosecutors 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of Admission of Samuel H. 
Sheppard's Writings in Moretti Book, was hand delivered to Teny Gilbert, on March 27, 
f 
2000 at Court Room 20 B, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Kathleen A. Martin 
Assistant Prosecutor 
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1988 WL 119921, State v. Crossen, (Ohio App. 5 Dist. 1988) 
*119921 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
The STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Terry L. CROSSEN, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 902. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, 
Ashland County. 
Oct. 18, 1988. 
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas 
Case No. 6346. 
Robert P. Desanto, Prosecuting Attorney, Ramona 
J. Rogers, Ass 't Prosecuting Attorney, Ashland, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
Mark C. Heydinger, Ashland, for defendant-
appellant. 
Before HOFFMAN, WISE and TURPIN, JJ. 
OPINION 
WISE, Judge. 
**l This is an appeal from a judgment entered by 
the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County 
sentencing defendant-appellant, Terry L. Crossen 
(appellant), after he had been found guilty by a jury of 
gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(3). Appellant argues the following two 
assignments of error: 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONTRAVENTION OF 
RULE 806 OF THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT, AND THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT 
TO A TT ACK THE CREDIBILITY OF NON 
TESTIFYING DECLARANT OF A HEARSAY 
- STATEMENT THROUGH THE USE OF 
SUBSEQUENT INCONSISTENT ST A TEMENTS, 
WHEN THE PRIOR HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF 
Page 1 
THE DECLARANT WAS ADMITTED AS AN 
EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Appellant was charged in a two-count indictment of 
having sexual contact with two-year old Rose Dotson 
(Rose) on two different occasions in January, 1988. 
A jury found appellant guilty of one count and not 
guilty of the other count. 
At trial, the two-year old Rose did not testify but, 
over objection of appellant, the State introduced, by 
way of testimony from the mother, Rose's out-of-
court statement made to the mother that appellant "had 
touched and kissed her cookie." Mother testified that 
"cookie" was Rose's terminology for "vagina." 
Following a prior hearing on the motion to suppress 
those statements of hearsay, the trial court had ruled: 
. . . that based on case law and the testimony 
presented, the statements made by the two (2) year old 
victim [Rose] to her mother constitute excited 
utterances. 
. .. that the mother, Wendy Dotson, will be entitled 
to testify to said statements at a trial on this case. 
Judgment Entry, March 10, 1988. 
Upon cross-examination of the mother, appellant 
attempted to elicit testimony from the mother 
concerning other statements of Rose made at the 
police station. The State objected to the admissibility 
of the police station statements on the grounds that 
those statements were not "excited utterances" and 
were therefore impermissible hearsay. Rose made her 
initial statement at home at approximately 1 :00 a.m. 
on January 21, 1988; the proffered evidence elicited 
outside the hearing of the jury establishes that the 
police station statements were made at approximately 
"1:00 a.m. to 1:30 a.m." on January 21, 1988; that 
mother and child were in the police station where a 
recorded conversation was had between a police clerk, 
mother, and Rose, the two-year-old. The transcript of 
the conversation at the police station reveals that 
Rose, in answering questions of the mother and police 
clerk, gave answers that were inconsistent within the 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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statement itself and with her initial statement to her 
mother. In her transcribed statement, Rose several 
times denied that the appellant had touched her or did 
anything to her. Also in the same transcribed 
statement, Rose indicated that appellant had touched 
her and at that time she had "told him to stop." See 
proffered defendant's Exhibit C. The trial court ruled 
that the police station statements were not "excited 
utterances" and not an exception to the hearsay rule 
and therefore could not be inquired into. 
**2 We sustain appellant's first assignment of error 
on two grounds. One, that the transcribed statement 
was admissible under Civ .R. 806 and second, that the 
transcribed statement was admissible under the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 
The initial statements of Rose that appellant had 
touched and kissed her "cookie" were introduced by 
the mother as an excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2) and therefore 
they were admitted as substantive evidence to prove 
the truth of the touching and kissing--the matter 
asserted. Evid.R. 806 provides for the admissibility 
of subsequent inconsistent statements of the declarant 
of the admitted hearsay statement for impeachment 
purposes. The admission of the inconsistent statement 
may be offered only to impeach the credibility of 
declarant and not to prove or disprove the matter 
asserted. State v. Kline (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 208 
(compare State v. Allender [Sept. 6, 1988], Stark 
App. No. CA-7464, unreported): 
An extrajudicial statement offered for impeachment 
purposes is not hearsay since it is not offered for the 
truth of what it states (Evid.R. 80l[C], construed). 
Syllabus 1, State v. Kline, supra. 
While the transcribed police station statements can 
be said to contain inconsistencies as well as 
consistencies with her initial statement to her mother, 
we also agree with syllabus 2, 3, and 4 of Kline, 
supra, and so hold that: 
2. When a witness testifies in court to admissible 
hearsay statements of a third-party declarant, that 
declarant' s inconsistent prior or subsequent 
statements, whether oral or written, may be admitted 
for the purpose of impeaching him. (Evid.R. 806, 
construed.) 
3. In Ohio, the rule is a liberal one with respect to 
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establishing inconsistency. The threshold 
inconsistency requirement is met if a statement offered 
for impeachment can be interpreted in either of two 
ways, though only one interpretation is actually 
inconsistent with the testimony of the witness sought 
to be impeached. Ohio evidence law recognizes 
contradiction by reference to a material fact omitted in 
a witness' prior statement or, in the case of a third-
party hearsay declarant, an omission in a statement 
made subsequent in time to one admitted in evidence 
at trial. By omitting a material fact under 
circumstances in which it was natural and reasonable 
for him to assert it, the declarant's subsequent 
statement thereby contradicts his prior statement 
admitted in evidence. 
4. Whether an inconsistent statement actually 
impeaches or otherwise discredits its maker is a 
question of weight for the jury. If the subsequent, 
extrajudicial statement is susceptible of different 
meanings, one of which would be inconsistent with 
the truth of in-court testimony, it is admissible in 
evidence for the jury to determine which is the true 
meaning, and to exclude such evidence is prejudicial 
error. ( Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130, paragraph 
four of the syllabus, applied and followed.) 
**3 We further hold that the statements made by 
Rose at the police station at a time "between 1 :00 
a.m. and 1:30 a.m." are as much an excited utterance 
as per the statements made to the mother at 
"approximately 1:00 a.m." and should have been 
admitted. State v. Duncan (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 215. 
We sustain appellant's first assignment of error. 
II 
Appellant argues that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in admitting evidence of prior sexual 
activity on the part of the defendant. The record 
discloses that defendant did not take the stand nor was 
any evidence by way of any witness or exhibits 
introduced into evidence by the appellant (the 
attempted introduction of the inconsistent statement by 
Rose was excluded by the trial court). The State 
offered the testimony of one Officer Lattanzi and also 
introduced, through witness Officer Lattanzi, State's 
Exhibit 4, which was a statement taken by Lattanzi 
from the appellant at 12:40 on January 21, 1988. The 
statement consists of eighteen pages, and on each page 
the officer admonishes appellant to be truthful, "tell 
me the truth ... tell me truthfully ... I don't believe 
that . . . tell me the truth ... " etc. Counsel for 
appellant cross-examined officer Lattanzi extensively 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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as to the officer's intent behind those statements. On 
re-direct, Officer Lattanzi was asked by the 
prosecutor at T.11-216: 
Q. In this case, why were you so persistent with 
your questioning that night, January 20th--that 
morning when you were questioning Terry Crossen, 
why were you persistent with your questioning? 
A. Terry doesn't like to talk about things like this. 
At T.II-217: 
Q. Have you had previous experience, talking to 
Terry Crossen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how many occasions, approximately? 
A. Two other occasions that I'm familiar with. 
Following that, the prosecutor approached the bench 
and informed the court that he was going into other 
acts for the reason to show that this particular act was 
not an accident. At T.II-219, the prosecutor asked the 
question: 
Q. Officer Lattanzi, you had stated to Mr. Fridline 
[counsel for appellant] that you did not, as he was--
Mr. Crossen was telling you that these were 
accidents, you did not believe him. Do you recall 
that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Page 3 
Q. I would like you to tell the jury exactly and in 
detail each and every reason that you had for not 
believing him. (Emphasis added). 
There was an objection which was overruled and the 
officer was permitted to testify in detail to previous 
acts committed by the appellant. The officer was 
permitted to testify not only that appellant had initially 
denied the prior acts, and that he had later said that 
they were accidents, but the officer was permitted to 
testify further that during the prior acts questioning, 
appellant had "stated that the four-year-old unzipped 
his pants and took his penis out and began rubbing on 
it." That appellant "had placed his finger in this 
four-year-old's vagina." Without belaboring the 
matter nor fattening this opinion, we simply sustain 
appellant's second assignment of error on the 
authority of State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 
157; State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 66; State 
v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391; State v. 
Thompson (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 496. 
**4. Having sustained both appellant's assignments 
of error, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 
Ashland County, is reversed. 
HOFFMAN, P.J., and TURPIN, J., concur. 
JUDGMENT ENTRY 
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum-Opinion 
on file, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 
Ashland County, is reversed and this matter is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings 
according to law and not inconsistent with the opinion 
filed herein. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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*14074 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
Ralph S. TRIMBLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
John M. STEW ART, Jr., Administrator of the 
Estate of Janet Ann Stewart, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 1327. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, 
Geauga County. 
Feb. 12, 1988. 
Civil Appeal from the Court of Cornman Pleas 
Probate Division, Case No. 85 P.C. 520. 
Thomas R. Reinstatler, Cincinnati, for plaintiff-
appellee. 
Barbara J. Gustaferro, Painesville, for defendant-
appellant. 
Before FORD, P.J., and COOK, and CHRISTLEY, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
COOK, Judge. 
**1 On March 6, 1985, Janet Ann Stewart died 
from injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 
Her husband, John M. Stewart, Jr., appellant, was 
appointed administrator of her estate. As 
administrator, he compiled an inventory of the 
decedent's estate. Included in the inventory was a 
money market account in Janet Stewart's name with a 
balance of $27 ,000. 
The decedent's father, Ralph S. Trimble, appellee, 
claimed that $23,000 of the account was his and that 
he had given that amount to his daughter to hold and 
to invest for his benefit. He claimed appellant was 
aware of this transfer of money and had assured him it 
would be returned to him once the estate was settled. 
However, appellant distributed the money to himself 
as the decedent's heir. 
On November 18, 1985, appellee filed a declaratory 
judgment action in the Geauga County Probate Court 
seeking a declaration as to ownership of the $23,000. 
He alleged he had given the decedent $24,000 to hold 
and to invest for him and that, in June 1984, he asked 
her to withdraw $1,000 of his money so he could buy 
furniture for an apartment. He further alleged that the 
remaining $23,000 should be returned to him. 
After a bench trial, the court found that appellee had 
transferred $24,000 to the decedent, that the 
transaction failed to be an express trust but was a 
resulting trust, and that appellant had developed a 
"cooly calculated scheme to deprive his father-in-law 
of his life savings." The court found that appellant 
held the $23,000 in a constructive trust for appellee. 
Appellant has appealed the judgment of the trial 
court and has filed the following five assignments of 
error: 
"1. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss 
appellee's complaint where the evidence showed a 
failure to file a claim against the estate of the deceased 
within the four month statutory limitation. 
"2. The court erred in admitting into evidence 
letters allegedly written by the deceased as they 
constituted hearsay and did not come within any 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
"3. The court erred in not finding that the transfer 
of funds by appellee to his daughter constituted a gift. 
"4. The court erred in finding that the transfer of 
funds from the appellee to his daughter constituted a 
constructive and/or resulting trust. 
"5. The court erred in failing to indemnify the 
appellant, John M. Stewart, Jr., administrator of the 
Estate of Janet Ann Stewart, from liability for 
administration of the estate pursuant to § 2113. 56 
O.R.C." 
The assigned errors are without merit. 
Appellant first contends that the court erred in not 
finding that appellee failed to file a claim against the 
estate within the four month statutory limitation. 
R. C. 2117. 07 requires that claims against an estate 
of a deceased be filed within four months after the 
appointment of an executor or administrator. If not 
timely filed, said claims are forever barred. 
**2 However, money held by a deceased in a 
resulting trust, as in the instant cause, is not a debt 
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and may be recovered from the personal 
representative of a deceased trustee without complying 
with the provisions of R. C. 2117. 07. S!aley v. 
Kreinbihl (1949), 152 Ohio St. 315. Generally 
speaking, traceable trust property may be recovered 
by the settlor-beneficiary although no claim has been 
filed against the estate. Cook v. Crider (1939), 63 
Ohio App. 12. 
Appellant's second contention is that the court erred 
in admitting into evidence, during appellee's case, two 
letters allegedly written by the deceased tending to 
prove appellee's claim. He argues thit Evid.R. 
804(B)(5) allows statements made by a decedent to be 
offered only by the administrator or executor of a 
decedent to rebut testimony by an adverse party, this 
limited use of said statements of a deceased being an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
The adoption of Evid.R. 601 abrogated the "dead 
man's" statute, R.C. 2317.03. Johnson v. Porter 
(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 58. In Johnson, the court 
referred to the Staff Note to Evid.R. 601 to the effect 
that concomitant to the adoption of said rule was the 
adoption of Evid.R. 804(B)(5). The note indicated 
Evid.R. 601 preserves one's competency to testify 
while Evid.R. 804(B)(5) permits the adverse party to 
introduce evidence, which would otherwise be 
hearsay, to rebut such testimony. 
However, in the instant cause, the otherwise hearsay 
evidence was offered by appellee in support of his 
claim against appellant as administrator of the 
decedent's estate. The two letters from the decedent 
were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 804(B)(3), 
"Statement against interest." The two letters included 
statements by the deceased which were at the time of 
their making "so far contrary to the declarant' s 
pecuniary or proprietary interest * * * that a 
reasonable man in his position would not have made 
the statement unless he believed it to be true." 
We conclude the court did not err in admitting the 
two letters from the deceased to appellee in appellee' s 
case. 
Appellant's third contention is that the court erred in 
not finding that the transfer of funds by appellee to his 
daughter constituted a gift. He argues that transfers 
made by a father to a daughter, without consideration, 
are presumed to be gifts. He further argues that this 
is true in the instant cause because the evidence 
indicated that the money was put into a money market 
account in the decedent's name and social security 
number only, the decedent regularly withdrew the 
interest accrued on the principal, and the decedent 
reported the interest as income on her tax return. 
However, the elements of a valid gift inter vivas are 
(1) an intention on the part of the donor to transfer 
title and right of possession of the property to the 
donee; and (2) delivery of the subject matter of the 
gift to the donee with the relinquishment of 
ownership, dominion, and control over it. Bolles v. 
Toledo Trust Co. (1936), 132 Ohio St. 21. 
In the instant cause, the evidence indicated that 
appellee did not intend to transfer title and right of 
possession of the $24,000 to his daughter and did not 
intend to relinquish ownership of the money to her. 
On March 21, 1984, after a phone call with appellee, 
decedent sent him a letter in which she thanked her 
father for a wedding gift and also assured him that she 
would do as he wished with a second check. She 
wrote " * * * and of course you can send me a check 
that I'll put it in the bank for you--I think you want it 
in my name and I understand your reason. That's 
fine." Subsequently, appellee sent the decedent a 
check for $1,000 as a wedding gift and a check for 
$24,000 to be deposited in a bank for his benefit. On 
April 9, 1984, decedent sent appellee another letter 
acknowledging receipt of the checks and reporting that 
she put the $24,000 along with her own money into a 
money market account. The account never fell below 
$23,000 after appellee had requested $1,000 of his 
money to buy furniture for his apartment. 
**3 We conclude that the court did not err by 
failing to find that the transfer of funds by appellee to 
his daughter was a gift. 
Appellant's fourth contention is that the court erred 
in finding that the transfer of funds from appellee to 
his daughter constituted a constructive and/or a 
resulting trust. 
However, appellant is unable to demonstrate his 
alleged error. A review of the trial court's decision 
indicates the court did not find that the subject transfer 
of funds constituted a constructive and/or a resulting 
trust. On the contrary, the court found that the 
decedent held appellee's money in a resulting trust and 
appellant, as a result of his action in including 
appellant's trust money in the estate inventory and 
distributing the money to himself as heir and 
beneficiary, held appellee 's money for him in a 
constructive trust. 
Appellant's last contention is that the court erred in 
failing to "indemnify" him from liability in the 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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administration of his wife's estate pursuant to R.C. 
2113.56. 
R.C. 2113.56, in pertinent part, provides: 
"An executor or administrator is not liable for any 
distribution made in compliance with sections 
2113.53, 2113.54, and 2113.55 of the Revised Code, 
* * * " 
R.C. 2113.53 provides: 
f 
"At any time after the appointment of an executor or 
administrator, the executor or administrator may 
distribute to the beneficiaries entitled thereto under the 
will, if there is no action pending to set aside the will, 
or to the heirs entitled thereto by law, in cash or in 
kind, any part or all of the assets of the estate. * * * 
If any executor or administrator distributes any part of 
the assets of the estate before the expiration of the 
time * * * for the filing of claims, he is personally 
liable * * * to any claimant who subsequently 
establishes his claim against the estate. The executor 
or administrator shall be liable only to the extent that 
the sum of the remaining assets of the estate * * * are 
insufficient to satisfy the share of the * * * claims 
against the estate. The executor or administrator shall 
not be liable in any case for an amount greater than 
the value of the estate that existed at the time that the 
distribution of assets was made and that was subject to 
* * * the claims." 
Appellant argues that since he distributed the estate 
proceeds in compliance with the statutes, he should be 
"indemnified" from liability. 
**4 While appellant cites good law, it is not 
applicable in the instant cause. Here, the trial court 
found that the transfer of the funds from appellee to 
his daughter constituted a resulting trust, appellee 
holding equitable title while the deceased held legal 
title. Thus, the funds were removed from the funds of 
the estate and out of the control of appellant as 
administrator of the estate. Appellant held the funds 
as trustee for appellee. He thus distributed the funds 
to himself not as administrator of the estate but as 
trustee of the constructive trust of the $23,000. 
Thus, the court did not err in failing to "indemnify" 
appellant from liability under R.C. 2113.56. 
Judgment affirmed. 
FORD, P.J., concurs with concurring opinion. 
CHRISTLEY, J., joins in concurring opinion. 
FORD, Presiding Judge, concurring. 
While I concur with the majority in this case, I am 
inclined to be more restrictive. The record in this 
case, and more specifically the conclusionary entry by 
the trial court, indicate that the trial court determined 
that the factual posture here provided the basis to 
conclude that the moneys in question were the subject 
of a constructive trust in which the appellant was the 
trustee for the benefit of the appellee. This 
determination is evidenced by the following language 
in the trial court's judgment entry: 
"5. Defendant holds the trust fund as trustee of a 
'constructive trust' for the benefit of plaintiff." 
In its Memorandum of Ruling, the trial court 
discusses both the concept of constructive trust as well 
as that of a resulting one. On the subject of 
constructive trust in this Memorandum, the trial court 
included the following quotations with attendant 
citations: 
"A constructive trust generally involves the 
existence of fraud in view of which an equitable title 
or interest is recognized in some person other than the 
taker or holder of legal title. Relief in constructive 
trust cases is granted on the ground of fraud, actual or 
constructive, or merely upon the breach of the general 
legal obligation of honesty and fair dealing. 
53 Ohio Juris.2d 579, Fehrman vs. Ellison, 290 
N.E.2d 190 
And furthermore: 
A 'constructive trust' arises when one having title to 
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to 
another because he would be unjustly enriched if he 
were allowed to retain it. 
Croston vs. Croston, 18 O.A.2d 159, 247 N.E.2 
765" 
Further, this Memorandum included this additional 
language: 
"The situation existing between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant surely falls within the purview of the 
definition of a 'constructive trust' in the last quote. 
Defendant has legal title to the Plaintiff's money by 
converting it to his own use. He also is subject to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another (the Plaintift) 
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because he would be unjustly enriched if he were 
allowed to retain it." 
See, also, 53 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1962) 391, 
392, Trusts, Section 4. 
**5. Consequently, in affirming the decision of the 
trial court, I would do so only on the basis that the 
trial court had properly concluded on the facts in this 
case that a constructive trust be imposed in favor of 
the appellee. 
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C .T, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTEHN DIVISION 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
THEE. W. SCRIPPS COl1PANY, et al, 
, 
Defendants 
PlAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
-ssell A.SherIDan 
rlCtorney for Plaintiff 
205 E.S.T. Bldg. 
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IN THE U~IITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT Of OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
SAHUEL H. SHEPPARD 
33 Hosel Str. 
Duisburg, ~est Germany, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
THEE. W. SCRIPPS COMPANY 
901 Lakeside Ave. 
Cleveland, Ohio 
LOUIS D. SELTZER 
17825 Lake 
Cleveland, Ohio 
SAMUEL R. GERBER 
11424 Cedar Rd. 
Cleveland, Ohio, 
Defendants 
c 67 ~333 
CIVIL NO. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLJ\INT 
l. The Plaintiff, Samuel ![. SherJJ21r•l presently 
resides at and is domiciled in Duisburg, West Germauy. The Deren-
dants, Louis B. Seltzer and Samuel R. Gerber are citizens of the 
State of Ohio. The Defendant, The E. VI. Scripps Com11any is a 
corporation incorporated under the laHs of the State of Ohio. 
2. This action arise:> under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States under title 42 §1983 
of the United States Code. The matter in controversy exceeds, 
exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Ten Thous~nd and 00/10 
Dollars ($10,000.00). 
J. T~e Defendant, Louis B. Seltzer was, at the tim 
. 
i 
I 
·1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I '~ 
of the wrongs herein complained of, the editor of a uewspaper call d 
"The Cleveland Press"; said newspaper was published by the Defen-
dant, The E. W. Scripps Company. 
4. The Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, was at the tim 
of the wrongs complained of, and still is, the coroner of Cuyahoga 
County, State of Ohio. As such coroner, he had the duty and the 
authority to investigate and report_~auses or deaths occurring 
----------._ - .. --··--------- ··-·-· --..... -. ·- ····-···-·- ·-- ..... --....... __ __ 
within said Coµnty. 
. -. ---- ·----···-··· r·· 1 I .. 1 \.• µ 
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5. The Plaintiff, Samuel H. Sheppard was in 1954, 
a physl.cl.an residing and practicine; in Cuyahoga Counly, State of 
Ohio, and specializin5 in neurosurgery. The Plaintiff in 1954 had 
an active and successful r:iedical practice. 
6. On or about the 4th day of July, 1954, Marilyn 
Sheppard, then the Plaintiff's v1ife, 1-i·:ls murdered i11 her hooe on 
Lake Road in Day Villac;e, Ohio by n 11erson or persons to the Plain 
tiff unknown. 
' 
7, Follo1·1ins such m11nler, the Defen•h1nt, Samuel R. 
f 
Gerber, commenced an investie;atlon lnto its causes nnd into the 
identity of the person or persons responsible for it. 
8. Following the murder, the Defenrlarits, Louis B. 
Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company commenced an editorial a ttac' 
upon the Plaintiff in the Cleveland Press, which was designed and 
calculated to, and did in fact, cause elective prosecuting offi-
----------··-------- -------
~---. ___ .... ----... 
cials to accuse him of complicity aforesaid . 
..... --··------
9. Between July 14, 1954 anrl July JO, 1954, the 
Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company cons-
pl.red with the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to implicate, accuse, 
arrest and indict the Plaintiff for the said murder, even though 
each of said Defendants well knew that the Plaintiff had nothing 
to do with the murder of Marilyn Sheppard. It was part of said 
conspiracy that the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, would use his 
... -o·f·r1·zGi~;~;;;1,~;· ;~···~~;·;~·~·;· ·t~·· ~·~ t- ·~·~-~-:~~ .. ~:~;;···:;-~·;~~:·-;::,; .. -~nd J 
wr.~i-r~-ii':f"·1;;;;1·i~-~~~-.-. ~~a:,,·~·~~se ~~· ~~-·~~~-~~·:-~~;-ri~l.ntif f • 
.......... ,,,,.,, ,,'"J"" ... -? .. .11".:•'"':"""..,... ... l"'.•,..-·~-......-u-- r-.-.·~ r1··,.., .......... ··•·: ...... ·· . .:·., .. ,...~ -··,;• .. • ..... .._, ........ ,,,. ..... . 
..... ~(··-·.._ .. ,,.... ·· 10. It was further a part of the conspiracy afore-
said that the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps 
Company ~ould mount and launch an attach upon the Plaintiff cal-
.. -------·---· cuiatcl·-t~--;;;;;-;t"hi-;-fr:m-ob·~-~~ni~~-: f~·i·;-t~ial uefore an im-
- -------·---- -
. - -·· -· -· ........ . -parlTal--j~~Y· -;~--~- ·f~·;r---j~·de;~·~··-i·t--~~-~ further a part of the said 
-·---···-···· .. --- -··-. 
conspiracy for the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Seri ps 
Company to so influence, intimidate and control the trial judge 
who presided at Plaintiff's criminal trial for the murder of his 
'-·---· 
wife, Marilyn Sheppard, as to cause said judge to make wrongful 
·-· ----------·----------
II 
11 -)-
,_.I and adverse rulings to the Plaintiff. It was furt;ll~r a part of 
said conspiracy for the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to issue 
.. ,,. ---.. 
state'l!~n.t-3.-~~e;gestlve of Plaintiff's guilt before an impartial 
------ _,_,_ ... __ -- ------·.. -· .. jury could be selected; and to give false and prejudicial testi-
--------" ..... __..._..._______..----- .. - ... ______ --.-...""_"_6.0'._~ .. r~-·~·-....w .. ":- ... 
~y_agai.r.s.t-thz ... P~.[_e_!!~~.t;.~ ·-~.~ ... ~.~-s---~~.~;-.~ :.. It ;.;as fu:rther a part 
of the conspiracy for the Defendants, Louis B. Seltz.er, and The 
, 
, 
E. W. Scripps Company to publish, during the trial, and to thus 
call to the attention of the Pl~intiff's petit jury, hearing the 
case against him, prejudicial and irw.dmissible material which the 
Defendants well knew could not reach said jury ln the courtroom 
and which the Defendants knew would cause the Plaintiff's wrong-
ful conviction. 
--·-··· 11. The Defendants effectu:J.ted each of the above-
described illegal and wrongful acts, and thus cause~, as planned, 
-the wrongful conviction of the Defendant. 
12. In so conspirine; and nctini:;, Lhe Defendants 
- deprived the Plaintlff of his Federal constitutional right to a 
fair trial under the Fourteenth Aa1cndment to the United States 
Constitution. 
lJ. By so conspirine; and actlng, the Defendants 
deprived the Plaintiff of~ Due Process of La·t1 under t.i\e Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
14. By so conspirine; and actini::;, the Defendants 
deprived the Plaintiff of the rights, privileges, at1d immunities 
secured to him by the United States Constitution. As a result of 
such conspiracy and action by the Defendants, lhe Plaintiff has 
been damaged, (1) by his imprisonment for approximately ten years 
in various jails and prisons in the State of Ohio, (2) by a loss 
of income for thirteen years as a physician licens~·in the State 
of Ohio, (J) by the fees, costs, and expenses of defending him-
self against the indictments and judgments wrongfully procured as 
set forth above, and (4) by the loss of reputation and community 
respect suffered as a result of these proceedin5s. 
--
-
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands: 
1. Yhat the Defendants be required to pay to the 
Plaintiff such damages as Plaintiff has sustained in consequence 
of Defendants' unla~ful acts as aforesaid. 
2. That Plaintiff have such other and further 
relie.f as the la:·1 and justice may require. 
A trial by jury ls hereby requested. 
f 
F. Lee Bailey 
Forty Court St. 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Benjamin L. Clark 
50 West Broad St. 
Columbus, Ohio, 
Of Counsel 
...--- u sell A. Sherman, 
Attorney for Plolntiff 
205 Elyria Savings & Trust Bl g. 
Elyria, Ohio 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
SAMUEL I-I. SHEPPARD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Tim E. W. ScmI'PS CoMPANY, Loms 
B. SELTZEH, SAl\!UEL R. GERBER, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
A P l' E A L from the 
United States District 
Court, Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, Eastern 
Division. 
Decided January 21, 1970. 
Before: PEG'K, l\1cCnEE and Col\rns, Circuit J udgcs. 
PECK, Circuit Judge. The complaint filed in the District 
Court in this action alleges a deprivation of constitutional 
rights and seeks recovery of damages under the provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges the murder of 
plaintiff's wife July 4, 1954, and his arrest, indictment, trial 
and conviction therefor. Recovery is sought from the publisher 
of a newspaper, its editor and the local county coroner, here-
inafter referred to as Gerber. It is alleged that as a result of 
conspiratorial conduct of the clefendants during the investiga-
tory and trial proceedings culminating in his conviction plain-
tiff was deprived of a fair trial, due process of law ancl the 
rights, privileges and immunities securecl to him by the United 
States Constitution. The judgment of conviction was subse-
quently vacatecl by the Supreme Court and the cause re-
. mantled for a new trial in the state court, which resulted in a 
verdict of acquittal. In the present action, the District Court 
sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, 
t 
• 
' 
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and this appeal wns perfected from the orcler granting that 
motion. 
Early in its opinion, the District Court offers this ob-
servation: 
"At the outset, this court determines that the com-
plaint must fail in its entirety if, for any reason, it 
is insufficient to state a claim as to Gerber, for, since 
defendants Scripps ancl Seltzer are chargeable only as 
private citizens and cannot be said to act 'uncler color 
of any State Law,' it is clear from nearly a hundred 
years of case law that the Civil Rights Act, affording 
protection against deprivation of civil rights by state ac-
tion, is not applicable to them, absent a conspiracy with 
one so acting." 
We are in accord with this expression. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1947); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 
(1883); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968); 
Cooper v. Wilson, 309 F.2cl 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Company, 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966). 
.. 
In his brief appellant states that the decision of the Dis-
trict Court appealed from was preclicatecl upon two con-
clusions of law, namely that the complaint <lid not allege 
conduct by Gerber "under color of law," and that Gerber's 
position as coroner was quasi-judicial in character, affording 
him immunity. While it is true that the opinion of the Dis-
trict Court deals with these two issues at length, that opinion 
further resolves a third issue adversely to appellant in this 
language: "[N]othing Gerber is alleged to have done under 
color of law could properly be said to be the cause of any 
deprivation of rights the plaintiff allegedly suffered." If this 
is true, whether or not the acts were done under color of 
law obviously becomes immaterial. 
. The issue as to whether Gerber's acts were the cause of 
the alle( .onstitutional deprivation has been passed upon by 
the Supreme Court in the opinion resulting in the vacation 
( 
~ 
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of appellant's conviction and the remand for retrial (Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ). That this issue was square-
ly before the Supreme Court becomes apparent in the first 
paragraph of Mr. J usticc Clark's opinion ( 384 U.S. 335): 
"This federal habeas corpus application involves the 
question whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial 
in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of 
his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect 
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and 
prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution . . . . 
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a 
fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the 
Fomteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judg-
ment." 
The opinion proceeds with a detailed review of the facts 
of the offense and of the trial, which is perhaps best summed 
up in the often quoted language of Judge Bell of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio and which is set forth in Justice Clark's opin-
ion (384 U.S. 356): 
"'Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were 
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue 
and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps un-
paralleled in recent annals. Throughout the preindict-
ment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and 
the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered 
to the insatiable interest of the American public in the 
bizarre . . . . In this atmosphere of a "Roman holiday" 
for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.' 
165 Ohio St., at 294, 135 N.E.2d 342." 
Justice Clark follows that quotation with this observation: 
"Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save the 
court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which the 
news media inflamed and prejudiced the public.'' The very 
fact that the trial was conducted under ~nch deplorable 
conditions, however, points up the fact tha' .! deprivation 
4 Sheppard v. E. W. Scripps Co., et al. No. 18977 
of appellant's constitutional rights resulted from the unfor-
tunate circumstances accompanying the trial itself rather than 
from any conduct Gerber may have engaged in. That the 
Supreme" Court found this to be true clearly appears from 
its opinion, which squarely places the blame where it really 
belongs under our system of administration of justice, on 
the trial judge. 
After observing that the trial began two weeks "before a 
highly contested election at which both Chief Prosecutor 
Mahon and Trial Judge Blythin were candidates for judge-
ships," Justice Clark continues (384 U.S. 354-55): 
"While we cannot say that Sheppard \Vas denied due 
process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against 
the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later 
rulings must be considered against the setting in which 
the trial was held. In light of this background, we be-
lieve that the arrangements made by the judge with 
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of the 
'judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled.' 
Estes v. State of Texas . . . 381 U.S., at .536, 85 S. Ct., 
at 1629. The fact is that bedlam reigned at the court-
house <luring the trial and newsmen took over prac-
tically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the par-
ticipants in the trial, especially Sheppard." 
After a further review of the facts and the publicity attendant 
upon the trial, the opinion commented upon the absence of 
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen and 
insulating the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and 
disruptive influences, and then concluded "that these pro-
cedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a 
fair trial." ( 384 U.S. 358). Finally, in concluding the opin-
ion Justice Clark stated ( 384 U.S. 363): 
"Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to 
protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial pub-
licity which saturated the community and to control dis-
' 
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rnptive inHuenccs in the courtroom, we must reverse the 
denial of the habeas petition." 
The essence of the complaint in the present case is con-
tained in its allegations charging a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights by Gerber, but as is demonstrated in the foregoing 
quotations the Supreme Court has already determined that 
the trial judge, not Gerber, is responsible for that depriva-
tion. In view of that determination, it must be here con-
cluded that the District Judge properly found that no cause 
of action was stated. 
Since we find the controlling issue to have been determined 
by the Supreme Court it is unnecessary to here examine the 
other grounds relied upon by the District Judge, and we 
expressly refrain from expressing an opinion on the claimed 
deficiency of the comp bin t in not specifically stating that the 
various acts allcgc<l were committed "un<lcr color of law," 
and as to whether Coroner Gerber was entitled to judicial 
immunity. W c observe, however, that even in the absence of 
the opinion in Sheppard \'. Maxwell, supra, the greater weight 
of authority and better reasoned decisions would require us 
to find the lack of a cause of action. Striker v. Pincher, 
317 F.2cl 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 
250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Dunn v. Gazola, 216 F.2d 
709 (1st Cir. 1954); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 
(5th Cir. 1954); Reinke v. Walworth, Count!} Sheriff, 282 F. 
Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Sinchak. v. Parente, 262 F. Supp. 
79 (W.D. Pa. 1966). In Striker v. Pincher, supra, this court 
considered a situation in which plaintiff claimed to have been 
deprived of constitutional rights by County Sheriff Pincher. 
We therein observed that "Pincher did not directly deprive 
Striker of any right of any sort. He had no authority or 
shadow of authority in respect to the trial. It is not claimed 
that statute, custom or usage gave Pincher any authority in 
respect to the trial . . . . " ( 317 F.2d 783). This pronounce-
ment has precise application to the circumstances with which 
t 
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we arc concerned, in which Gerber "had no authority or 
shadow of authority in respect to the trial." In Cuiksa, supra, 
we considered a situation in which the alleged deprivation, as 
here, consisted of actions on the part of a defendant in in-
itiating the prosecution and in testifying at the trial. We 
held that these actions did not deprive the appellant therein 
of any constitutional right, and with reference to the constable 
defendant-appellce observed, "Nor is he responsible for the 
subsequent actions and rulings of the judge." (250 F.2d 704). 
Similarly, in the present case it could scarcely be contended 
that Gerber was in any way responsible for Judge Blythin's 
conduct of the trial. In Whiltington, supra, another situa-
tion existed in which the plaintiff alleged a {deprivation of 
rights, but wherein the court pointed out that "[i]f there was 
any denial of due process, the efficient cause thereof was 
the omission of the state probate judge to give notice of 
the proceeding. That failure is not attributable to these 
defendants." ( 201 F.2d 811). The analogy to the case here 
reviewed is too obvious to require comment. 
In accordance with the foregoing, .. the order of the District 
Court from which this appeal was perfected is affirmed. 
McCnEE, Circuit J udgc, concurring. I concur in the result 
reached by my brethren. However, I do not agree with 
their conclusion that the Supreme Court's determination in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 ( 1966), that appellant's 
rights were violated by "the [trial] judge's failure to insulate 
the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive 
influences'', 384 U.S. at 358 n. 11, necessarily precludes the 
possibility that his rights might also have been violated by 
a conspiracy to prosecute him without cause and to prevent 
a ·fair trial. Appellant has alleged that certain private per-
SOJlS engaged in publishing newspapers and a public official 
coqspircd to corrupt the judicial process in order to obtain 
his convil for murder, and, on a motion to dismiss, we 
must accc1)L these allegations as true. The deprivation of 
' I 
I I 
! 
' 
No. 18977 Sheppard v. E. \V. Scripps Co., et al. 7 
constitutional rights which the Supreme Court found in Shep-
pard v. Ji.faxwell and the deprivation alleged here are not 
mutually exclusive, and the fact that appellant chose one as 
the basis for his habeas corpus petition in 1963 should not 
prevent him from basing a damage suit on the othcr.1 
Nevertheless, I agree with the District Judge who hcl<l 
that the allegedly actionable conduct of Coroner Gerber is 
insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act by a doc-
trine analogous to that of judicial immunity. As the District 
Judge observed in his opinion, the Supreme Court has held 
that the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate the common law 
immunity of certain public officials for actions within their 
jurisdiction.2 This doctrine applies not only to judges, but 
also to other officials whose duties arc quasi-judicial. Kenney 
v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom. 
Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). And the same im-
munity has been extended to coroners. Hebert v. -Morley, 
273 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 ( C.D. Cal. 1967). I agree with the 
District Court that the only conduct in which defendant 
Gerber is alleged to have engaged under color of law must 
be characterized, under the laws of Ohio and under the Civil 
Rights Act, as quasi-judicial. See State ex rel. Harrison v. 
Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641, 644-45, 150 N .E. 78 ( 1925). Since 
this action cannot be maintained against Gerber, the only 
defendant who acted under color of law, it must fail as to 
the others. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 
1965). 
1 An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in 
state court, but that does not render unavailable the remedies of 
the Civil Rights Act. Diversity is not alleged here, and therefore 
I do not consider whether appellant has a good cause of action 
for malicious prosecution under the Ohio tort law. See Sheppard 
\'. The E. W. Scripps Co., No. 18,978 (6th Cir. 1969). 
2 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 
Wall. 335 (1872) (common law immunity). The immunity applies 
even to acts which are alleged, as are those here, to have been 
maliciously or corruptly motivated. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554. 
The policy behind this rule is not difficult to discern. As the Supreme 
Court expressed it, a judge "should not have to 1-- that unsatisfied 
litigants may hound him with litigation chargi alice and cor-
ruption. Imposing such a burden on judges w contribute not 
to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
SAMUEL H. SnEPPAnD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
TIIE E. vV. SCIUI'PS COMPANY, Loms 
n. SELTZEH, SAMUEL R. GEnnEn, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
A l' l' E A L from the 
United States District 
Court, Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, Eastern 
Division. 
Dcciclecl January 21, 1970. 
Before: PECK, McCmm and CoMBS, Circuit Judges. 
PECK, Circuit Judge. The complaint filed in the District 
Court in this action alleges a deprivation of constitutional 
rights and seeks recovery of damages under the provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges the murder of 
plaintiff's wife July 4, 1954, and his arrest, indictment, trial 
and conviction therefor. H.ccovcry is sought from the publisher 
of a newspaper, its editor and the local county coroner, here-
inafter referred to as Gerber. It is alleged that as a result of 
conspiratorial conduct of the defendants during the investiga-
tory and trial proceedings culminating in his conviction plain-
tiff was deprived of a fair trial, due process of law and the 
rights, privileges and immunities secured to him by the United 
States Constitution. The judgment of conviction was subse-
quently vacated by the Supreme Court and the cause re-
man<le<l for a new trial in the state court, which resulted in a 
verdict of acquittal. In the present action, the District Court 
sust:i.ined the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, 
( ' 
• 
2 Sheppard v. E. W. Scripps Co., et al. No. 18977 
and this appeal was perfected from the order granting that 
motion. 
Early in its opinion, the District Court oilers this ob-
servation: 
"At the outset, this court determines that the com-
plaint must fail in its entirety if, for any reason, it 
is insuHicient to state a claim as to Gerber, for, since 
defendants Scripps ancl Seltzer are chargeable only as 
private citizens and cannot be said to act 'under color 
of any State Law,' it is clear from nearly a hundred 
years of case law that the Civil H.ights Act, a[orcling 
protection against deprivation of civil rights by state ac-
tion, is not applicable to them, absent a conspiracy with 
one so acting." 
We are in accord wilh this expression. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (19117); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 
( 1883); I'.Ittlligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968); 
Cooper v. 'Vilson, 309 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Jones v. 
Alfred II. Mayer Company, 255 F. Supp. l15 (E.D. Jvlo. 1966). 
In his brief appellant states th;t the decision of the Dis-
trict Court appealed from was predicated upon two con-
clusions of law, namely that the complaint did not allege 
conduct by Gerber "under color of law," and that Gerber's 
position as coroner was quasi-judicial in character, affording 
him immunity. While it is true that the opinion of the Dis-
trict Court deals with these two issues at length, that opinion 
further resolves a third issue adversely to appellant in this 
language: "[N]othing Gerber is alleged to have clone under 
color of law could properly be said to be the cause of any 
deprivation of rights the plaintiff allegedly suffered." U this 
is true, whether or not the acts were done under color of 
law obviously becomes immaterial. 
The issue as to whether Gerber's acts were the cause of 
the all( constitutional deprivation has been passed upon by 
the Supreme Court in the opinion resulting in the vacation I l 
•'j 
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of appellant's conviction and the remand for retrial (Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ). That this issue was square-
ly before the Supreme Court becomes apparent in the first 
paragraph of Mr. Justice Clark's opinion ( 384 U.S. 335): 
"This federal habeas corpus application involves the 
question whether Sheppard was deprivecl of a fair trial 
in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of 
his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect 
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive ancl 
prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution . . . . 
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a 
fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judg-
ment." 
The opinion proceeds with a detailed review of the facts 
of the offense and of the trial, which is perhaps best summed 
up in the often quoted language of Judge Bell of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio and which is set forth in Justice Clark's opin-
ion (384 U.S. 356): 
"'Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were 
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue 
and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps un-
paralleled in recent annals. Throughout the preindict-
mcnt investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and 
the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered 
to the insatiable interest of the American public in the 
bizarre . . . . In this atmosphere of a "Homan holiday" 
for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.' 
165 Ohio St., at 2~H, 135 N.E.2d 312." 
Justice Clark follows that quotation with this observation: 
"Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save the 
court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which the 
news media inflamed and prejudiced the public." The very 
fact that the trial was conducted under such deplorable 
conditions, however, points up the fact th:f ·c deprivation 
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of appellant's constitutional rights resulted from the unfor-
tunate circumstances accompanying the trial itself rather than 
from any conduct Gerber may have engaged in. That the 
Supreme· Court found this to be true clearly appears from 
its opinion, which squarely places the blame where it really 
belongs under our system of administration of justice, on 
the trial judge. 
After observing that the trial began two weeks "before a 
highly contested election at which both Chief Prosecutor 
Mahon and Trial Judge Blythin were candidates for judge-
ships," Justice Clark continues ( 384 U.S. 354-55): 
"While \:Ve cannot say that Sheppard was denied <luc 
process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against 
the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later 
rulings must be considered against the setting in which 
the trial was held. In light of this background, we be-
lieve that the arrangements made by the judge with 
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of the 
'judicial serenity ancl calm to which [he] was entitled.' 
Estes v. State of Texas . . . 381 U.S., at 536, 85 S. Ct., 
at 1629. The fact is that bedlam reigned at the court-
house during the trial and newsmen took over prac-
tically the entire courtroom, hmmding most of the par-
ticipants in the trial, especially Sheppard." 
After a further review of the facts and the publicity attendant 
upon the trial, the opinion commented upon the absence of 
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen and 
insulating the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and 
disruptive influences, ancl then concluded "that these pro-
cedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a 
fair trial." ( 384 U.S. 358). Finally, in concluding the opin-
ion Justice Clark stated ( 384 U.S. 363): 
"Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to 
protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial pub-
licity which saturated the community and to control dis-
' • 
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ruptivc inlluences in the courlroorn, we must reverse the 
denial of the habeas petition." 
The essence of the complaint in the present case is con-
tained in ils allegations charging a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights by Gerber, but as is demonstrated in the foregoing 
quotations the Supreme Court has already determined that 
the trial judge, not Gerber, is responsible for that depriva-
tion. In view of that determination, it must be here con-
cluded that the District J udgc properly found that no cause 
of action was stated. 
Since we find the controlling issue to have been determined 
by the Supreme Court il is unnecessary to here examine the 
other grounds relied upon by the District Judge, and we 
expressly refrain from expressing an opinion on the claimed 
deficiency of the complaint in not specifically stating that the 
various acls allcgecl were committccl "under color of law," 
ancl as to whether Coroner Gerber was entitled to judicial 
immunity. vVc observe, however, that even in the absence of 
the opinion in Slzcppard v. i\! ax well, supra, the greater weight 
of authority ancl better reasoned decisions would require us 
to fincl the lack of a cause of aclion. Strihcr v. Pincl1cr, 
317 F.2cl 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Cuiksa v. Citu of Mansfield, 
250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Dunn v. Gawla, 216 F.2d 
709 (1st Cir. 1954); "\Vhittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 
(5th Cir. 1954); Reinke v. Wal worth, C ountu Sl1eriff, 282 F. 
Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Sinclwk v. Parente, 262 F. Supp. 
79 (W.D. l)a. 1966). In Striher v. Pincher, supra, this court 
considered a situation in which plaintiff claimed to have been 
deprived of constitutional rights by County Sheriff finchcr. 
We therein observed that "Pincher did not directly deprive 
Striker of any right of any sort. He hac.1 no authority or 
shadow of authority in respect to the trial. It is not claimed 
that statute, custom or usage gave Pincher any authority in 
respect to the trial . . . . " ( 317 F .2d 783). This pronounce-
ment has precise application to the circumstances with which 
f 
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we arc concerned, in which Gerber "had no authority or 
shadow of authority in respect to the trial." In Cuiksa, supra, 
we considered a situation in which the alleged deprivation, as 
here, consisted of actions on the part of a defendant in in-
itialing the prosecution and in testifying at the trial. We 
held that these actions <lid not deprive the appellant therein 
of any constitutional right, and with reference to the constable 
defendant-appcllec observed, "Nor is he responsible for the 
subsequent actions and rulings of the judge." (250 F.2d 7M). 
Similarly, in the present case it could scarcely be contended 
that Gerber was in any way responsible for Judge Blythin's 
conduct of the trial. In YVhittington, supra, another situa-
tion existed in which the plaintiIT alleged a {deprivation of 
rights, but wherein the court pointed out that "[i]f there was 
any denial of due process, the efficient cause thereof was 
the omission of the state probate judge to give notice of 
the proceeding. That failure is not attributable to these 
defendants." ( 201 F.2d 811). The analogy to the case here 
reviewed is too obvious to require comment. 
In accordance with the foregoing>- the order of the District 
Court from which this appeal was perfected is affirmed. 
McCnEE, Circuit J udgc, concurring. I concur in the result 
reached by my brethren. However, I do not agree with 
their conclusion that the Supreme Court's determination in 
Sl1eppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), that appellant's 
rights were violated by "the [trial] judge's failure to insulate 
the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive 
inilucnces", 384 U.S. at 358 n. 11, necessarily precludes the 
possibility that his rights might also have been violated by 
a conspiracy to prosecute him without cause and to prevent 
a' fair trial. Appellant has alleged that certain private per-
scm engaged in publishing newspapers and a public official 
co1,1spircd to corrupt the judicial process in order to obtain 
his conv\ l for murder,. and, on a motion to di.smi~s, we 
must acccvc these allegat10ns as true. The clcpnvat10n of 
i 
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constitutional rights which the Supreme Court found in Shep-
pard v. Maxwell and the deprivation alleged here arc not 
mutually exclusive, and the fact that appellant chose one as 
the basis for his habeas corpus petition in 1963 should not 
prevent him from basing a damage suit on the othcr. 1 
Nevertheless, I agree with the District J udgc who held 
that the allegedly actionable conduct of Coroner Gerber is 
insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act by a doc-
trine analogous to that of judicial immunity. As the District 
Judge observed in his opinion, the Supreme Court has held 
that the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate the common law 
immunity of certain public officials for actions within their 
jurisdiction.2 This doctrine applies not only to judges, but 
also to other officials whose duties arc quasi-judicial. Kenney 
v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom. 
Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). And the same im-
munity has been extended to coroners. Hebert v. Morley, 
273 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 ( C.D. Cal. 1967). I agree with the 
District Court that the only conduct in which defendant 
Gerber is alleged to have engaged under color of law must 
be characterized, under the laws of Ohio and under the Civil 
Hights Act, as quasi-judicial. See State ex rel. Harrison v. 
Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641, 644-45, 150 N.E. 78 (1925). Since 
this action cannot be maintained against Gerber, the only 
defendant who acted under color of law, it must fail as to 
the others. Haldane v. Chagnon, 3,15 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 
1965). 
1 An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in 
state court, but that docs not render unavailable the remedies of 
the Civil Rights Act. Diversity is not alleged here, and therefore 
I do not consider whether appellant has a good cause of action 
for malicious prosecution under the Ohio tort law. Sec Sheppard 
v. The E. W. Scripps Co,, No. l!l,978 (Gth Cir. 1969). 
2 Pierson v. Ray, 3llG U,S. 547 (1967); sec Bradley v. Fisher, 13 
Wall. 335 (lll72) (common law immunity). The immunity applies 
even to acts which arc alleged, as arc those here, to have been 
maliciously or corruptly motivated. Pierson v. Ray, 3llG U.S. nt 55•t 
The policy behind this rule is not difficult to discern. As the Supreme 
Court expressed it, a judge "should not have to fc:ir that unsatisfied 
litigants may hound him with litigation chargi1' 'alice and cor-
ruption. Imposing such a burden on judges wt\ contribute not 
to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id. 
